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Due to the highly uncertain nature of pursuing new business opportunities 
(Knight, 1992; McMullen & Shepherd, 2006), failure is a rather common 
outcome of entrepreneurial endeavors (Brüderl, Preisendörfer, & Ziegler, 
1992; Shane, 2009; Wiklund, Baker, & Shepherd, 2010). Take family busi-
nesses as an example. They comprise a significant share of all businesses (up 
to 90% in the USA [Dumas, 1992; Heck & Trent, 1999; Kets de Vries, 
1993]), but nearly 70% of family businesses fail to make it through the 
second generation, and roughly 90% fail to survive through the third gen-
eration (Kets de Vries, 1993). Similarly, established firms often undertake 
entrepreneurial projects as part of corporate entrepreneurship initiatives to 
create new products, enter new markets, explore new technologies, and/
or build new businesses (Zahra, Jennings, & Kuratko, 1999). Like busi-
nesses, however, entrepreneurial projects are basically experiments with 
unknowable outcomes; there is an air of uncertainty (McGrath, 1999). 
Thus, sporadic or even repeated entrepreneurial project failure is an inevi-
tability in firms practicing corporate entrepreneurship (Burgelman & 
Välikangas, 2005). In fact, Boulding, Morgan, & Staelin (1997) estimated 
that 35–45% of all new products fail (Boulding, Morgan, & Staelin, 1997). 
In this chapter, we build on Shepherd, Covin, and Kuratko (2009); Shepherd 
(2009); and Ucbasaran, Shepherd, Lockett, and Lyons (2013).
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Further, investigating 95 venturing units in corporations with headquar-
ters in eight countries worldwide, Campbell, Birkinshaw, Morrison, and 
van Basten Batenburg (2003) reported no successful examples among 
firms exploring “new leg” ventures or among internal corporate ventures 
started with the sole purpose of pursuing growth opportunities in novel 
(to the firm) product-market domains.
While being able to successfully exploit entrepreneurial opportunities is 
the primary aim of all entrepreneurship initiatives, failure is not necessar-
ily a completely negative outcome as some failures can lay the foundation 
for subsequent success. This path from failure to success has been seen in 
new product development (Maidique & Zirger, 1985), internal corporate 
venturing (McGrath, 1995), and joint venturing (Peng & Shenkar, 2002). 
Although some failures lead to positive outcomes, success is by no means 
a certain consequence of failure. For success to follow failure, it is essential 
for the entrepreneur or the organization to learn from past mistakes. As 
such, entrepreneurial failures can actually be potential learning opportuni-
ties (Green, Welsh, & Dehler, 2003). By signaling a problem with one’s 
current beliefs or actions (Chuang & Baum, 2003; Sitkin, 1992), failure 
can motivate individuals to look for solutions (Ginsberg, 1988; McGrath, 
2001; Morrison, 2002; Petroski, 1985). Furthermore, failure often trig-
gers sensemaking efforts, thereby serving as a rich source of information 
for learning. Thus, learning from failure refers to “the sense that one 
is acquiring, and can apply, knowledge and skills” (Spreitzer, Sutcliffe, 
Dutton, Sonenshein, & Grant, 2005, p. 538) as a direct result of a failure 
experience. When entrepreneurs take chances, learn from their failures, 
and act on the new knowledge they gain from those failures, economies 
are able to progress (Hoetker & Agarwal, 2007; Knott & Posen, 2005; 
Mason & Harrison, 2006). Moreover, when entrepreneurs and organi-
zations gain new knowledge from their failures, they are more likely to 
become involved in future entrepreneurial initiatives (Hayek, 1945). Such 
initiatives can serve as possible foundations for firm growth and renewal 
(McGrath, Tsai, Venkataraman, & MacMillan, 1996), thus increasing indi-
viduals’ odds of succeeding with a new venture after a failure. In a similar 
way, those who failed in a corporate setting can aid their organizations in 
improving their innovation “hit rate” by learning from their failures and 
emotionally committing to later projects.
Because failure can motivate individuals to gain new knowledge or skills, 
researchers argue that people tend to learn more from their failures than 
from their successes (Petroski, 1985; Popper, 1959). Sitkin (1992, p. 243) 
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suggested that learning from failure is most likely to occur when failure 
events “(1) result from thoughtfully planned actions, (2) have uncertain 
outcomes, (3) are of modest scale, (4) are executed and responded to 
with alacrity, and (5) take place in domains that are familiar enough to 
permit effective learning.” However, alacrity—namely, “brisk and cheer-
ful readiness” (Concise Oxford Dictionary)—is difficult to maintain when 
the failure means that the entrepreneur loses something that is important 
to him or her (i.e., a project or a business). Although most organizations 
and their members believe that learning from failure is important, they 
generally find doing so to be difficult (Cannon & Edmondson, 2005), 
as do entrepreneurs who lose their business (Byrne & Shepherd, 2015; 
Shepherd, 2003). More specifically, while failure reveals important infor-
mation, organizations and individuals are frequently unsuccessful at fully 
processing that information (Weick, 1990; Weick & Sutcliffe, 2006). We 
need to gain a deeper understanding of the costs of failure (project and 
business) to the entrepreneur (and by extension the organization) and the 
ways these costs of failure can create obstacles to achieving the benefits of 
failure—namely, learning from the experience. However, before we delve 
into the nuances of advancing knowledge on this important topic, it is 
important to start with what we mean by failure (in its various forms).
defInIng entrepreneurIal faIlures
Failure has been conceptualized in a number of ways, including as the 
discontinuity of ownership (for a review, see Singh, Corner, & Pavlovich, 
2007), bankruptcy (e.g., Shepherd & Haynie, 2011), and discontinu-
ity caused either by insolvency (Coelho & McClure, 2005; Shepherd, 
2003) or by performance below the decision makers’ threshold (e.g., 
Ucbasaran, Westhead, Wright, & Flores, 2010). Indeed, Ucbasaran et al. 
(2013, p. 175) defined business failure as “the cessation of involvement in 
a venture because it has not met a minimum threshold for economic viabil-
ity as stipulated by the (founding) entrepreneur.” Shepherd and colleagues 
defined project failure as the termination of an initiative to create orga-
nizational value that has fallen short of its goals (Shepherd, Covin, et al., 
2009; Shepherd, Patzelt, & Wolfe, 2011; see also Hoang & Rothaermel, 
2005; McGrath, 1999). While there are numerous definitions of failure, we 
believe researchers should utilize the definition that best fits their study’s 
research question. Nevertheless, it is important that the authors offer a 
clear, explicit definition and a justification for its use. We organize the rest 
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of this chapter based on the major implications arising from the failure of 
projects or businesses—implications that are financial, social, emotional, 
or a combination of these implications—and offer various future research 
opportunities.
the fInancIal ImplIcatIons of entrepreneurIal 
faIlure
The literature captures a long history of scholars focusing on the financial 
costs of failure. For example, an entrepreneur must often take on personal 
debt to fund his or her business, which he or she must then bear after busi-
ness failure (Cope, 2011). However, it appears that the financial costs of 
failure (project and/or business) for the individual depend on the culture 
and the broader institutions in which the individual is embedded. For 
example, bankruptcy laws vary by country, and the “strictness” of these 
laws has a bearing on the financial costs borne by the entrepreneur from 
a failed business (Lee, Peng, & Barney, 2007; Lee, Yamakawa, Peng, & 
Barney, 2011). Although we have gained a substantial understanding of 
the financial costs of failure (and, for that matter, the financial costs of per-
sisting despite poor performance [Gimeno, Folta, Cooper, & Woo, 1997; 
Shepherd, Wiklund, & Haynie, 2009]), there is still much to learn.
Recovering from the financial costs of entrepreneurial failure. First, 
we believe it is necessary to gain deeper insights into how and why some 
entrepreneurs are able to bounce back from the financial consequences of 
failure more quickly than others. What actions do such individuals take 
after a bankruptcy, for example, that help them deal with the financial 
burden? Moreover, the notion of recovery may be too limiting because it 
could imply that individuals merely “overcome” the financial costs of fail-
ure but does not take into account the possible financial benefits of failure 
over time. For instance, ultimate financial success after business failure 
may require individuals to take on traditional employment for a period 
to restore their financial reserves before entering into business ownership 
again. Further, those who suffer considerable financial loss after business 
failure are likely to learn significant lessons in how to manage their sub-
sequent venture’s financial resources. What lessons are learned in these 
difficult contexts, and how do they affect the business model and capital 
structure of subsequent ventures? Future research can investigate these 
entrepreneurial career paths (i.e., the sequence of entrepreneurs’ career 
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decisions) to help elucidate how entrepreneurs recover from the financial 
consequences of business failure and capitalize on the benefits of failure to 
attain financial success in the long term.
Even less clear are the financial costs of project failure within an organi-
zation. How does project failure impact the career trajectory of a member 
of a failed team effort? In some organizations, management may view the 
leaders of a failed project as lacking leadership, competence, and persis-
tence, which likely obstructs a productive career path for the corporate 
entrepreneur. In response, the entrepreneur is likely to either leave the 
organization or stay with the organization but limit entrepreneurial activ-
ity (and other organizational members are likely to learn the same behavior 
vicariously). With either response from the (former) corporate entrepre-
neur, the organization loses because it kills (or substantially diminishes) 
the entrepreneurial spirit of the firm. In contrast, there are organizations 
that are more tolerant of failure and even some that celebrate it. How does 
a project failure impact the career trajectory of a corporate entrepreneur 
in such an organization (Farson & Keyes, 2006), especially in contrast to 
organizations that penalize those associated with a project failure? Perhaps 
the impact of failure on career trajectory depends on what type of failure 
occurred, whether the individual learned from the failure, and how that 
learning can be applied to benefit the organization.
Entrepreneurial failure and opportunity costs. Regardless of the 
direct financial cost of failure (independent or corporate entrepreneur), 
the failure of a project or a business may lead to the termination of a 
(insufficiently profitable) track but may also reveal other more profitable 
entrepreneurial opportunities. More can be done to try to explain how the 
continued pursuit of one potential opportunity (e.g., persisting with a los-
ing course of action) has an “opportunity” opportunity cost. It could be 
that the opportunity costs are financial. For example, because the entre-
preneur is investing resources (e.g., money) into the current venture, he 
or she is unable to pursue another potential opportunity. However, the 
opportunity costs could also be attentional. When focusing attention on 
the exploitation of a focal potential opportunity, for instance, the entre-
preneur may have insufficient attention to notice and/or interpret signals 
of an alternate potential opportunity. Although these financial and/or 
attentional constraints could help determine the nature of the opportu-
nity cost, it is important to understand how some are able to reduce these 
constraints and thus reduce the opportunity costs. This may involve mak-
ing small investments and rapid terminations (Bakker & Shepherd, 2017; 
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McGrath, 1999), using a conscious strategy to maintain slack (i.e., cogni-
tive, financial, and time) resources not allocated to the current entrepre-
neurial endeavor (Bradley, Wiklund, & Shepherd, 2011; George, 2005), 
and using other means for structuring and/or “freeing up” attentional 
resources (Ocasio, 1997; Shepherd, McMullen, & Ocasio, 2017).
Financial costs of entrepreneurial failure at the group level of anal-
ysis. Not only does the entrepreneur take on the financial costs of business 
failure, his or her family is also likely to feel the consequences. As such, 
future research on entrepreneurs embedded within a family is likely to 
provide a more complete picture of the financial costs of business failure 
for entrepreneurs. For example, while two entrepreneurs may experience 
the same immediate financial costs after business failure, heterogeneity in 
each entrepreneur’s family wealth may lead to different long-term finan-
cial implications. Similarly, the costs of a project failure can more easily be 
borne by a wealthier organization than a poorer one. How does the wealth 
of the actor embedded in his or her family or organization influence the 
nature of the financial costs, the decision to start and to terminate the 
entrepreneurial endeavor, and the ability and willingness to move on to 
the next entrepreneurial endeavor? For example, on the surface, it appears 
that the financial costs of failure will be less damaging to entrepreneurs 
belonging to wealthier groups (e.g., a corporate entrepreneur embedded 
in a wealthier organization or an independent entrepreneur embedded in 
a wealthier family); however, those who belong to less wealthy groups may 
tend to engage in riskier behavior overall (e.g., believe they are in a loss 
situation and thus act in ways in line with prospect theory), thus making 
them more likely to engage in subsequent entrepreneurial actions. Future 
research can investigate whether those with less family wealth “behind” 
their entrepreneurial endeavors are more likely to approach a potential 
opportunity with real options reasoning (for real options reasoning, see 
McGrath, 1999; McGrath & Nerkar, 2004), have a fundamentally differ-
ent approach to removing doubt about a potential opportunity and/or 
exploiting it, or are more willing to “gamble” it all with a “big bet.”
Financial losses from entrepreneurial failure and subsequent entre-
preneurial action. In line with research demonstrating the importance of 
financial slack for funding both the experimentation needed for success-
ful entrepreneurship (see George, 2005) and start-up costs/early-stage 
growth (Gilbert, McDougall, & Audretsch, 2006), it may seem like the 
financial costs of business failure would be a significant barrier to later 
entrepreneurial activity, especially in the short term. However, the  resulting 
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resource scarcity after business failure could create an environment that 
fosters bricolage (i.e., “making do with whatever is at hand” [Baker & 
Nelson, 2005, p. 330]), particularly for entrepreneurs in more resource- 
poor contexts and/or corporate entrepreneurs who find it more difficult 
to garner resources from management after failure. That is, resource scar-
city can trigger entrepreneurial activity, thereby transforming an initial 
financial cost into a different form of resource advantage (i.e., a valuable 
resource combination). Are some more able to switch from entrepreneur-
ial activity spurred by slack resources to entrepreneurial activity spurred 
by resource scarcity? What mechanisms enable people to switch between 
these two different “sources” of entrepreneurial activity? The answers to 
these questions likely relate to the mindset triggered (or applied) to the 
adversity inherent in a resource-scarce environment.
Although we may be first drawn to prospect theory (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1979) for answers, there are some other interesting possibilities. 
For some, this type of adversity likely generates an emphasis on resource 
protection—a reactive posture that involves consuming some resources to 
stop further resources from being lost. However, for others, this adversity 
could lead to an emphasis on resource investment—a proactive posture 
to replenish and grow resources (Hobfoll, 2001; Hobfoll & Lilly, 1993). 
Williams and Shepherd (2016) showed that those who engage in resource 
investment in the form of entrepreneurial action (i.e., the creation of a 
venture to alleviate the suffering of others in the aftermath of a natural 
disaster) have superior functioning in that adverse environment than those 
who do not engage in entrepreneurial action (controlling for a host of fac-
tors). Therefore, it may not be whether one fails or how much adversity 
one experiences when he or she fails; the ultimate net costs (or benefits) of 
failure may be determined by the mindset one develops regarding whether 
to protect remaining resources (through conservative action) or to invest 
those resources in entrepreneurial activity. Shepherd and Williams (2017) 
also proposed that regulatory focus theory is critical in explaining who 
escapes an adverse situation by constructing a new work identity (i.e., 
those with a promotion focus) and who languishes (i.e., those with a pre-
vention focus). As we gain a deeper understanding of how different mind-
sets influence individuals’ reactions, responses, and recovery from failure, 
attention needs to turn to the antecedents of these mindsets. For exam-
ple, why do some invest resources under adversity while others protect 
their remaining resources, and why do some who hit rock bottom after 
entrepreneurial failure approach the situation with a promotion focus and 
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 others with a prevention focus? We need to gain a deeper understanding 
of the mindsets that reflect the different paths and trajectories of recovery 
and resilience.
Entrepreneurial failure and careers. Since failure can cause an entre-
preneur personal financial hardship, end his or her source of income, harm 
his or her professional reputation, and result in negative financial out-
comes for his or her family and/or firm, it is an extreme context that 
enables researchers to investigate career paths so as to survey the limits 
of and thus advance theories on careers to reveal the long-term financial 
implications of failure. This type of research can contribute to and extend 
current theories by heeding calls for more studies on career constraints 
(Arnold & Cohen, 2008) and on the ways individuals adapt to new 
careers (Savickas, 2002), especially when their prior career path has ended 
(Haynie & Shepherd, 2011; Shepherd & Williams, 2017) and they have 
financial burdens. As we hinted at earlier, we also suggest that the context 
of failure (of a project or a business) is ideal for extending theories of bri-
colage because it involves significant resource scarcity (because of failure’s 
financial costs). Both theories may be further advanced if future research 
investigates how entrepreneurs who experience failure engage in bricolage 
to open up new career opportunities. Perhaps by cobbling together dif-
ferent career paths (or elements within those careers), the individual can 
combine and recombine various work-related aspects in ways that create a 
new career opportunity.
the socIal ImplIcatIons of entrepreneurIal faIlure
Although failure can have positive consequences for the individual (e.g., 
learning and personal growth [Cope, 2011; McGrath, 1999; Shepherd, 
2003]), others often do not see entrepreneurial failure in such an opti-
mistic light (D’Aveni, 1990; Semadeni, Cannella, Fraser, and Lee, 2008; 
Sutton & Callahan, 1987). As noted by March and Shapira (1987, 
p. 1413), “society values risk taking, but not gambling, and what is meant 
by gambling is risk taking that turns out badly.” Oftentimes, the devasta-
tion of a business failure on others (e.g., former employees, suppliers, and 
other stakeholders) is highly salient and immediate, whereas the learning 
benefits (for the individual and the economy) are more diffuse and take 
time to develop.
Indeed, there are many reports of entrepreneurs of failed businesses 
being judged harshly by others. For example, historically, individuals who 
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went bankrupt were subject to punishments that included “forfeiture of all 
property, relinquishment of spousal consortium, revocation of citizenship, 
surrendering children as slaves, prohibition from holding public office, 
imprisonment, and death”; they were required to “bang their buttocks on 
a rock before a heckling crowd,” “wear distinguishing clothes in public,” 
and were subject to other means of degradation and humiliation in public 
(Efrat, 2006, p.  366). Modern-day equivalents of others’ responses to 
failed (or failing) entrepreneurs include rejection, avoidance, disengage-
ment, and denigration (D’Aveni, 1990; Sutton & Callahan, 1987). These 
harsh judgments place considerable blame (Semadeni, Cannella, Fraser, 
& Lee, 2008; Sutton & Callahan, 1987) for the failure on the individual, 
and they suggest that the entrepreneur should be punished (Efrat, 2005; 
Lee et  al., 2007) and feel shame (Probst & Raisch, 2005; Wiesenfeld, 
Wurthmann, & Hambrick, 2008). To a greater or lesser extent, these judg-
ments on business failure are reflected in countries’ bankruptcy laws (Lee 
et al., 2011; Lee, Peng, & Barney, 2007), and these judgments on project 
failure are reflected in an organization’s culture (Cannon & Edmondson, 
2001; Tucker & Edmondson, 2003). Such harsh judgments and the stress 
they generate can negatively impact the economic (Semadeni et al., 2008; 
Sutton & Callahan, 1987), psychological (Byrne & Shepherd, 2015; 
Shepherd, 2003), and physical (Cope, 2011; Whyley, 1998) well-being 
of the individual who experiences the failure. We believe that the current 
literature on this topic has only scratched the surface when it comes to 
exploring the social costs of business failure for entrepreneurs.
Relationship ties after entrepreneurial failure. While we have a strong 
understanding of relationship ties and the ways they affect entrepreneurial 
activity within (Kelley, Peters, & O’Connor, 2009; Stam & Elfring, 2008) 
and outside (Hoang & Antoncic, 2003; Jack, 2005) the organization, we 
know relatively little about how these ties change (if at all) after failure. 
Future research has the chance to add to the body of knowledge on this 
topic by investigating how entrepreneurs’ formal (business) relationships 
change after inter-organizational relationships cease as a result of busi-
ness failure and when intra-organizational relationships cease due to proj-
ect failure. Does failure damage these relationships beyond repair, or can 
they be restored? If these relationship ties are salvageable, what are the 
mechanisms for rebuilding a relationship tie (or conserving it through the 
failure) as opposed to creating a new tie? Indeed, the question becomes 
whether the entrepreneur is better off investing his or her time in rebuild-
ing relationships damaged by failure or creating new relationship ties (i.e., 
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relationships without baggage). How much can entrepreneurs who have 
experienced failure rely on past relationships to help in the recovery pro-
cess and/or to provide resources for later entrepreneurial activity? How 
do the entrepreneur’s and others’ attributions of the failure impact these 
relationship ties?
Perhaps external attributions of failure help reduce the number of lost 
ties, but internal attributions of failure strengthen existing ties. Although 
the benefits of weak ties are lauded in the literature for their role in the 
identification of a potential opportunity (Ardichvili, Cardozo, & Ray, 
2003; Hoang & Antoncic, 2003), perhaps strong ties are more important 
in helping reduce the social costs of failure. It could be that strong ties 
represent surrogates that help repair weak ties damaged by failure or help 
in the creation of new weak ties necessitated by the loss of previous weak 
ties through failure. Not only are some ties likely to be damaged and lost 
as the result of failure, but it could be that some ties change in nature 
after failure. For example, a failure may serve to strengthen the entrepre-
neur’s relationship with a weak tie (i.e., a weak tie changes to a strong 
tie) and weaken his or her relationship with a previously strong tie (i.e., 
a strong tie becomes a weak tie). There are numerous opportunities for 
future research to explore the termination, use, rebuilding, re-activation, 
and transformation of relationship ties after a failure.
Entrepreneurial failure and social stigma. While we understand 
how entrepreneurs tend to handle stigmatizing situations (Sutton & 
Callahan, 1987), we know less about when and why project and business 
failure represents a stigmatizing event. Beyond entrepreneurs’ impression- 
management strategies, do particular forms of failure and/or types of 
entrepreneurs cause greater stigma? For instance, Shepherd and Patzelt 
(2015) found that entrepreneurs who are homosexual are likely to be stig-
matized more from business failure than those who are heterosexual (in 
one region of Germany) and that those who are trying to preserve the 
environment are stigmatized less for business failure than those who were 
not trying to preserve the environment. Perhaps female entrepreneurs in 
supposed “masculine” industries (or masculine organizations or roles) 
face more stigmatization from failure compared to women in “feminine” 
industries (or organizations or roles) or men in “masculine” industries 
(or organizations or roles). That is, when individuals deviate from the 
norm and fail, they may face greater social costs compared to more “nor-
mal failures.” If this is the case, however, there is a societal influence that 
deters the type of novelty that can be highly transformative. What is the 
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impact of stigma for entrepreneurial failures? Perhaps a high stigma for 
entrepreneurial failure stops some individuals from engaging in entrepre-
neurial action (as a type of fear of failure), from engaging in certain types 
of entrepreneurial projects or businesses (i.e., those for which the stigma 
from failure is the greatest), from terminating a poorly performing project 
or business (delaying the social costs of failure but increasing the financial 
costs of failure when it arrives), and/or jumping ship from a failing busi-
ness in the hope of avoiding stigma. Each alternative represents a host of 
considerations and implications.
Entrepreneurial failure role models. While we have some knowl-
edge on how successful entrepreneurs are viewed and serve as role mod-
els (Bosma, Hessels, Schutjens, Van Praag, & Verheul, 2012; Krueger & 
Brazeal, 1994), we can still learn more about the social signals sent and 
received from entrepreneurs’ business failures. For instance, on the one 
hand, parents who have entrepreneurial success often serve as role mod-
els for their children, not only showing them that entrepreneurship is an 
achievable and desirable career path but also encouraging their children’s 
entrepreneurial goals and actions (Davidsson & Honig, 2003). On the 
other hand, how does a parent’s business failure influence the “next gen-
eration” of potential entrepreneurs? Children who observe and experi-
ence (either directly or indirectly) the negative effects of business failure 
may decide to forgo entrepreneurial careers because they view business 
failure as a highly prominent possible outcome of entrepreneurial action. 
However, parents’ ability to “bounce back” after failure and show resil-
ience could decrease their children’s fear of failure, thereby helping them 
form more positive beliefs about failure (for initial evidence, see Politis & 
Gabrielsson, 2009). Perhaps parents who had a business fail (or a men-
tor who had a project fail) serve as excellent role models for how to face 
failure, deal with it, recover, learn, and—ultimately—move forward. That 
is, maybe people can learn how to cope with and benefit from failure 
vicariously. If this is the case, increases in the saliency of entrepreneurial 
failure (perhaps through coping self-efficacy or some other mechanism) 
may make entrepreneurial action more—rather than less—likely.
The role of social skills in dealing with entrepreneurial failure. We 
believe it is valuable to explore the role social skills play in entrepreneurs’ 
responses to failure, including social perception, expressiveness, impression 
management, and social adaptability. Baron and Tang (2009) highlighted 
a number of studies establishing the impact these skills have on impor-
tant outcomes in numerous contexts, including  entrepreneurial contexts. 
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Individuals with strong social skills are likely to be highly skilled at reduc-
ing the social costs of business failure (e.g., through shrewd storytelling 
and sensegiving to others regarding the failure and the role they played 
in that failure) as well as the associated psychological costs. Additionally, 
individuals with strong social skills often have wider and more diverse 
social networks (Diener & Seligman, 2002) with which they can connect 
to talk about a failure and receive support. Future research can investigate 
the role social skills play in how entrepreneurs manage the social and psy-
chological costs (and, indirectly, the financial costs, as discussed above) of 
failure.
There is also an opportunity to gain a deeper understanding of the 
impact of failure through a fine-grained understanding of an entrepreneur’s 
(corporate or independent) social skills. Which of the social skills—social 
perception, expressiveness, impression management, and social adapt-
ability—influence which aspect of the failure-resilience/failure-recovery 
process and to what effect? For example, expressiveness may facilitate a 
loss orientation, and a loss orientation might help reduce the social costs 
of the failure as the individual is able to express his or her negative emo-
tions over the failure. However, it appears that having a loss orientation 
for an extended period can exacerbate negative psychological reactions 
to the failure (see Shepherd et al., 2011). Therefore, it might not be that 
greater social skills necessarily lead to better outcomes—there could be 
tradeoffs, diminishing returns, and even negative returns at high levels. To 
the extent that there are tradeoffs between different outcomes of a par-
ticular social skill, can the downside of that particular social skill be over-
come or offset by the activation of a different social skill? It is important to 
gain a deeper understanding of not only the different social skills and their 
differential effects on failure outcomes but also the ways these social skills 
can be combined to reduce the overall costs of failure. With this deeper 
understanding, we hope that scholars are in a better position to teach stu-
dents and budding entrepreneurs (whether corporate or independent) the 
social skills that not only help them succeed with their projects and their 
businesses but also deal with the possibility (and even the probability) that 
their entrepreneurial endeavors (projects or businesses) will fail.
Entrepreneurial failure and work-life balance. While research has 
explored work-life balance among entrepreneurs (Shepherd & Haynie, 
2009a, 2009b), we know little about how entrepreneurs continue to 
achieve work-life balance when the work aspect of this relationship has 
ended in failure. For instance, is an entrepreneur able to  compartmentalize 
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a failure into his or her work micro-identity, thus making the failure 
have minimal effect on other micro-identities (e.g., the “spouse” micro- 
identity), or does the failure lead to spillover effects? If some are able to 
compartmentalize the identity experiencing the failure, then it is impor-
tant to gain an understanding of how the micro-identity experiencing fail-
ure is “insulated” from the individual’s other micro-identities—that is, 
how is the “contagion” stopped from affecting other micro-identities and 
important others (e.g., family members). Although insulation may reduce 
the extent of failure’s harm, perhaps engaging other micro-identities to 
confront the failure experience (rather than hide from it or insulate it) can 
provide better outcomes for the entrepreneur (or for some entrepreneurs 
some of the time). This line of research can be pursued, for example, by 
finding out whether divorce rates rise after major business or project fail-
ures and whether differences in this social cost can be explained by the 
ways entrepreneurs manage their micro-identities after experiencing fail-
ure. Future research addressing these topics will provide deeper insights 
into failure’s social costs and will hopefully enable entrepreneurs to reduce 
such costs while maximizing the social benefits possible after failure.
the emotIonal ImplIcatIons of entrepreneurIal 
faIlure
When individuals experience the failure of a business or project that was 
important to them, they can have a negative emotional reaction—namely, 
grief (Shepherd, 2003; Shepherd & Cardon, 2009; Shepherd, Covin, 
et al., 2009; Shepherd et al., 2011). While grief can motivate individuals 
to seek information about a failure, which is required for learning (Cyert 
& March, 1963; Kiesler & Sproull, 1982), it often disrupts the atten-
tion allocation and information processing entrepreneurs need to learn 
from their failure experiences (consistent with Bower, 1992; Fredrickson, 
2001). Based on previous research, we know that negative emotions can 
have adverse effects on cognitions. First, negative emotions “narrow indi-
viduals’ momentary thought-action repertoire by calling forth specific 
action tendencies (e.g., attack, flee) … [whereas] many positive emotions 
broaden individuals’ momentary thought-action repertoires, prompting 
them to pursue a wider range of thoughts and actions than is typical” 
(Fredrickson & Branigan, 2005, p. 314). Thus, individuals who want to 
generate original innovations that result in future products should avoid 
negative emotions (Fredrickson, 1998). Second, research has shown that 
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negative emotions have a harmful effect on individuals’ commitment, 
including on entrepreneurs’ motivation to start another venture after pre-
vious business failure (Shepherd, 2003) or on team members’ desire to 
put forth personal resources to meet organizational objectives after proj-
ect failure (Allen & Meyer, 1990; O’Reilly & Chatman, 1986; Shepherd 
et al., 2011). While being committed to an action can improve perfor-
mance, this commitment needs to be balanced with learning from failure 
because learning from failure can also improve performance (McGrath, 
1999). Finally, research has found that negative emotions “narrow peo-
ple’s attention, making them miss the forest for the trees” (Fredrickson, 
2001, p. 222); disrupt creative and integrative thinking (Estrada, Isen, & 
Young, 1997; Fredrickson & Branigan, 2005; Isen, Daubman, & Nowicki, 
1987); and, ultimately, inhibit learning (Fredrickson & Branigan, 2005; 
Masters, Barden, & Ford, 1979). As time passes (i.e., after the failure), 
these negative emotions tend to dissipate (Shepherd et al., 2011), thereby 
eliminating barriers to learning from failure.
However, it appears that these emotional obstacles to learning from 
failure can be reduced more quickly for some individuals (e.g., those 
with learned optimism [Cardon & McGrath, 1999] and self-compassion 
[Shepherd & Cardon, 2009]) and for those embedded within certain 
groups (e.g., the family [Shepherd, 2009]) and/or embedded in certain 
organizations (Shepherd, Covin, & Kuratko, 2009; Shepherd et al., 2011). 
Previous studies provide a solid foundation for understanding how and 
why negative emotional reactions are triggered after failure upon which 
we can build to explore a number of important research topics.
The emotions that make up grief from entrepreneurial failure. 
Previous studies have used the term grief when referring to any of the 
negative emotions caused by the loss of a business (Byrne & Shepherd, 
2015; Shepherd, 2003, 2009) or project (Shepherd & Cardon, 2009; 
Shepherd, Covin et  al., 2009, 2011), and current research has investi-
gated how grief (used as an umbrella term) affects cognitive processes 
related to learning. However, research on emotions has shown that dif-
ferent forms of negative emotions have distinct sources as well as vary-
ing impacts on cognition (Bodenhausen, Sheppard, & Kramer, 1994; 
Keltner, Ellsworth, & Edwards, 1993). As such, do specific failures result 
in different psychological outcomes because they cause different forms of 
negative emotions that in turn affect cognitive processes in distinct ways? 
Some failures for some people are likely to generate feelings of shame, 
while other failures may cause feelings of guilt in other individuals. These 
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are related but distinct negative emotions, both of which can contribute 
to the feeling of grief but can have different effects on cognition. Shame 
over a failure involves an evaluation of the self such that one feels that he 
or she is a “bad person,” whereas guilt over a failure involves an evalua-
tion of the behavior such that one feels that he or she has done a “bad 
thing” (Lewis, 1971; Niedenthal, Tangney, & Gavanski, 1994; Tangney, 
1989, 1991, 1993). How do these differences between shame and guilt 
(as contributors to grief over the loss generated by failure) influence the 
cognitive process of learning from failure and the motivational process of 
trying again? Additionally, it is important to understand the processes for 
dealing with shame and distinguish them from the processes of dealing 
with guilt. Such an understanding of the distinct antecedents, roles, and 
effects of the different negative emotions that make up grief over failure 
will not only help explain the psychological implications of failure but 
will also have some normative implications—namely, we will learn how to 
facilitate the grief- recovery process to maximize and accelerate learning 
from the experience and to regain motivation and positive functioning.
Moreover, could a combination of particular negative emotions com-
prising the entrepreneur’s grief (contingent and/or configuration) better 
explain the psychological costs stemming from failure compared to the 
impact of each of these emotions separately (main effects)? There is an 
opportunity to explore the different configurations of negative emotions 
that make up grief across individuals, failures, and/or situations. What is 
perhaps even more interesting is to investigate these configurations over 
time. For example, it could be that for a group of entrepreneurs, a particu-
lar negative emotion dominates immediately after the failure (e.g., anger) 
but then declines shortly after, whereas another negative emotion may 
have low salience early but comes to dominate later (e.g., guilt). It will 
be interesting to determine whether entrepreneurs feel a “sequence” of 
negative emotions; whether different individuals, failures, and/or situa-
tions have different sequences; and what psychological implications these 
different sequences have for the entrepreneurs whose projects or busi-
nesses failed.
Building resources from entrepreneurial failure experiences. 
Exploring the psychological costs of the negative emotions associated with 
business failure is a worthwhile and interesting endeavor, and there is still 
a great deal of work to be done in this area (see previous point). However, 
future research should also explore the positive psychological effects of 
grief after business failure. Research on grief has shown that for some 
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individuals who experience grief after a loved one dies, going through 
the grieving process leads to personal growth (Hogan, Greenfield, & 
Schmidt, 2001). Researchers have the opportunity to gain a deeper under-
standing of this notion of personal growth over and above merely recover-
ing from the experience (Cope, 2011; Shepherd, 2003; Shepherd et al., 
2011), which in turn leads to several interesting questions. After busi-
ness failure, do entrepreneurs realize they have emotional and cognitive 
resources they did not notice before, and/or does experiencing failure 
help them build such resources? For instance, handling failure may help 
entrepreneurs develop coping self-efficacy, emotional intelligence, and 
other sources of resilience. These resilience resources (and self-knowledge 
of them) are likely to impact subsequent entrepreneurial thinking in terms 
of, for example, the willingness to bear uncertainty, which in turn influ-
ences the formation of opportunity beliefs. That is, resilience resources 
can lead to a greater emotional investment in an entrepreneurial course 
of action given the belief in one’s ability to effectively deal with negative 
emotional reactions if it were to fail. These resources can also result in less 
reliance on sunk costs and a decreased need to appear consistent, which 
will help reduce persistence with a poorly performing project or business 
given the individual’s confidence in being able to deal with the conse-
quence of failure.
Positive emotions in the aftermath of entrepreneurial failure. 
Exploring the role of positive emotions and self-regulation is also likely to 
lead to a deeper understanding of personal growth from business failure. 
Fredrickson (1998, 2003), for example, showed that positive emotions 
can counter the influence negative emotions have in limiting attention and 
information processing and can help develop resources that aid in coping 
with difficulty. Thus, do entrepreneurs with more dispositional optimism 
(e.g., see Hmieleski & Baron, 2009) and positive affect (e.g., see Baron, 
Tang, & Hmieleski, 2011) realize greater advantages from failure experi-
ences (e.g., recover more rapidly, learn more successfully and experience 
more personal growth)? As opposed to depending on trait affect, maybe 
entrepreneurs proactively utilize positive emotions to cope with grief 
resulting from business failure. If they do, however, how are they able to 
generate such positive emotions after such a significant loss? Perhaps this 
is where emotional intelligence plays a particularly important role. That 
is, emotionally intelligent entrepreneurs are likely to be aware of their 
highly negative emotions from project or business failure, realize that the 
 generation of positive emotions both “undoes” negative emotions and 
helps build resources (Fredrickson, 1998), and know how to trigger these 
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positive emotions. It is the last of these actions that might be easier said 
than done—namely, generating positive emotions when one is “feeling 
blue” from a major failure can be a difficult task. How are some people 
able to trigger positive emotions after a failure or other form of major loss?
Therefore, understanding the techniques for stimulating positive emo-
tions may be particularly helpful for entrepreneurs who frequently face 
failures and other major setbacks. Such techniques could include watching 
a comedy or telling oneself a joke. Alternatively, it may be less about the 
entrepreneur’s possession of emotional intelligence him- or herself but 
more about having emotionally intelligent individuals in his or her net-
work. For example, individuals who are able to generate positive emotions 
to remove the obstacles to learning from failure and moving on from the 
event might be those with friends who (1) recognize that their entrepre-
neur friend is experiencing negative emotions and has a need for positive 
emotions and (2) know how to generate those positive emotions in him or 
her. Again, gaining a deeper understanding of the “who” and the “how” 
of generating positive emotions in a loss situation is likely to be highly 
important in advancing our understanding of both the emotional costs 
and benefits of project and business failure. This stream of research may 
have an interesting implication for entrepreneurship education—teaching 
our students how to stimulate positive emotions even in the most adverse 
of situations.
Multiple entrepreneurial failures. While research has begun explor-
ing the “hot cognitions” related to failure for entrepreneurs, there has 
been limited research exploring the implications of multiple failures (for 
exceptions, see Shepherd, Haynie, & Patzelt, 2012; Ucbasaran, Westhead, 
& Wright, 2009; Ucbasaran et al., 2010). For instance, are the psycho-
logical costs of a second failure different than those of a first failure, and 
if so, how? The entrepreneur could be more psychologically equipped 
to cope with a second failure due to his or her previous failure experi-
ence. Alternatively, the entrepreneur could still be dealing with unresolved 
issues from the first failure that make issues associated with the subse-
quent failure even worse—a form of accumulated grief (Shepherd et al., 
2012). The trial-by-fire model (Swaminathan, 1996) may explain differ-
ences between those experiencing their first failure and those experiencing 
subsequent failure—at least in part. More specifically, among those who 
experience failure, only those who are “psychologically” strong (through 
self- selection or learning) will try again and thus suffer fewer psychologi-




Also, consistent with the trial-by-fire model, individuals learn from 
their failures about how best to deal with failure (i.e., build resources and 
capabilities that promote resilience) and are thus able to more quickly 
recover, learn, and try again. However, we also know that continual expo-
sure to difficult events can lead to a form of desensitization such that 
adverse stimuli no longer generate negative emotional reactions (Ashforth 
& Kreiner, 2002). Do entrepreneurs who have suffered many failures 
become desensitized to failure such that a failure no longer generates a 
negative emotional reaction? As authors, we have certainly had so many 
papers rejected that the “sting” of a rejection is no longer as painful as 
it once was. If we consider no emotional reaction to be cold cognition, 
how are the decision- making process and reactions as part of the entre-
preneurial process different from a hotter form of cognition? It seems that 
too much “hot” is detrimental to cognitive performance (e.g., in terms 
of obstructing learning), but are there negative consequences from the 
cognition being too cold? May be there is an optimal amount of heat 
and/or maybe more heat is necessary for some cognitive tasks but less for 
other cognitive tasks. We believe there is ample opportunity to contrib-
ute further insights into the inter-relationship between multiple failure 
experiences and hot cognition in understanding the costs and benefits for 
entrepreneurs after failure.
multIple and Inter-related ImplIcatIons 
of entrepreneurIal faIlure
The inter-relationship between the financial and social implications 
of failure. The more we study the social implications of entrepreneurial 
failure, the more insights we will gain into its financial implications. For 
instance, are there financial implications for entrepreneurs after business 
failure as a result of damage to their ventures or informal networks? The 
direct financial costs resulting from failure, such as the loss of wealth or 
remaining debt, may result in less hardship than the indirect financial costs 
stemming from a damaged reputation and loss of status, which may have a 
longer-lasting negative impact. If this is the case, initial attempts at recov-
ery are likely to be more successful if they are aimed at maintaining one’s 
network (or rapidly repairing it or developing a new one) as opposed to 
overcoming direct financial costs. By taking a closer look at the connection 
between the social and financial costs of business failure for entrepreneurs, 
we will begin to gain a deeper understanding of why some recovery strat-
D.A. SHEPHERD AND H. PATZELT
 81
egies are more useful than others and perhaps how we can teach entre-
preneurs (and budding entrepreneurs) how to “manage” failure to more 
quickly recover from its negative consequences. Alternatively, it could be 
the opposite sequence that facilitates recovery—that by recovering finan-
cially, the individual then has an easier time regaining and repairing his or 
her formal business network and creating a new network. We suspect that 
the process is more iterative and reciprocal—namely, as the entrepreneur 
starts to financially recover from the failure, his or her network relation-
ships start to be repaired, which helps the entrepreneur recover financially, 
which helps with social recovery, and so on in the form of a virtuous 
spiral. The important research questions then become what factors start, 
perpetuate, and stop these virtual spirals, and are they the same factors that 
stop or slow a vicious spiral.
The inter-relationship between the social and emotional/psycho-
logical implications of entrepreneurial failure. Losing a business is often 
a very personal experience; however, some failures are more public. For 
instance, in project failure, employees are told the project is terminated, 
the team is disbanded, and people are redeployed to others projects. When 
it comes to business failure, the physical business is closed, employees 
vacate the factory or office, and customers and suppliers eventually find 
out about the business failure. The extent of the public nature of the fail-
ure (and its associated social costs) is likely to impact the entrepreneur’s 
emotional reaction to the failure and its psychological costs. For example, 
when it comes to project failure, organizational culture can have an impor-
tant influence on the “social evaluation” of those who fail (Cannon & 
Edmondson, 2001) and, in doing so, likely has a psychological impact on 
those who act entrepreneurially, particularly those who experience failure.
Although we expect that the public nature of a failure will increase its 
social costs, which will in turn exacerbate the psychological costs, perhaps 
a public failure leads to different social costs such that the psychological 
costs of a highly public failure are less than the psychological costs of hid-
ing the failure from others (in an attempt to reduce the social costs). It 
could be that public failures generate unexpected social and psychologi-
cal benefits, such as support groups being formed to help the entrepre-
neur deal with the failure that might have otherwise not been available if 
these others were not aware of the failure. Like for other hidden stigmas 
(Pachankis, 2007), anxiety and stress about keeping the failure hidden 
from the public is likely to generate negative psychological and perhaps 
physical consequences for the entrepreneur. In this way, in terms of failure 
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and its public nature, maybe the entrepreneur is better off disclosing than 
hiding. Indeed, by disclosing the failure rather than having others find out 
about it on their own, the entrepreneur can use impression-management 
strategies to minimize the social (and perhaps also the financial) implica-
tions of the failure event (Sutton & Callahan, 1987).
The inter-relationship between the emotional and cognitive impli-
cations of entrepreneurial failure. Research on bereavement has shown 
that some losses are more likely than others to result in complicated grief—
namely, elevated grief and grief over an extended period of time (Neimeyer, 
2006). For instance, parents whose children commit suicide often have 
complicated grief, and their feelings of grief are frequently made worse by 
additional feelings of shame and embarrassment, thereby making it more 
challenging to “talk through their grief” with others (Mitchell, Mitchell, 
& Smith, 2004). As a result, others may find it more difficult to start dis-
cussions as they worry about saying the “wrong thing” (Nolen-Hoeksema 
& Davis, 1999). Shame and embarrassment are psychological costs caused 
by the expectation of others’ judgments and lead those experiencing such 
feelings to avoid others and, as a consequence, to incur social costs, such 
as loneliness. Under what circumstances (i.e., characteristics of the entre-
preneur and/or of the social context) can feelings of embarrassment and 
shame over failure be lessened or even eliminated? We know that grief is 
lower in environments where failure is normalized (Ashforth & Kreiner, 
2002; Shepherd et al., 2011), but perhaps attempts to take emotion out 
of the entrepreneurial process undermine the emotional commitment nec-
essary to form a strong team, persist through challenges, and make an 
entrepreneurial endeavor a success. Ironically, by avoiding the negative 
emotions of failure (by taking emotions out of the process), the entrepre-
neur may be making failure a more likely outcome for the focal project or 
business.
The inter-relationship between the financial and psychological 
implications of entrepreneurial failure. There is also an opportunity for 
future research to further investigate the relationship between the finan-
cial costs and the psychological costs of entrepreneurial failure. Do the 
psychological costs stemming from business failure have financial implica-
tions? The psychological costs of business failure may not only be a  barrier 
to learning from failure but could also obstruct the entrepreneur of a failed 
business from moving on to generate a new income source (the delay of 
which makes the financial costs of business failure even worse). For exam-
ple, if the entrepreneur ruminates over his or her business failure, it may 
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inhibit him or her from interviewing for a new job or seeking out new ven-
ture opportunities. On the other hand, the psychological costs of the fail-
ure could be obvious to potential employers during the interview process 
(e.g., the person does not demonstrate adequate enthusiasm or self-belief 
to assure the prospective employer that he or she can successfully take on 
the new role), ultimately leading to the individual’s failure in securing 
the position. Similarly, the psychological costs of failure may represent an 
obstacle to the team member of a failed project that prevents him or her 
from recommitting to the organization and enjoying the financial rewards 
of those efforts (e.g., promotion and bonus). That is, the psychological 
costs of project failure mean that the employee is less enthusiastic about 
subsequent roles and projects, is less committed to the organization, and 
has less positive interactions with management, all of which can have nega-
tive implications for his or her career within the organization.
In terms of individuals’ recovery from the financial and psychological 
costs of entrepreneurial failure, does sequence matter? Perhaps an entre-
preneur has to lessen the psychological costs of business failure before 
trying to recover from the financial costs (i.e., acquiring employment and 
pursuing his or her next entrepreneurial endeavor), or perhaps he or she 
needs to reduce the financial costs first, which will diminish one of the 
major stressors of business failure and thereby help reduce the psychologi-
cal costs. Likewise, perhaps an employee needs to focus on overcoming 
the psychological costs of failure before focusing on the financial implica-
tions in terms of career progression. By extension, the organization may 
need to focus on the psychological costs of project failure for its employees 
first and then the sequence of roles that advance those employees’ careers. 
Alternatively, by fully focusing on the next project as a way to advance 
one’s career, the employee can reduce the financial implications of the loss 
and thus reduce the failure’s psychological costs (there is some evidence 
of this approach by engineers [Shepherd, Patzelt, Williams, & Warnecke, 
2014]). Because there are still so many unknowns regarding this topic, 
future research on the inter-relationship between the financial and psy-
chological costs (perhaps even the spiral involving a reciprocal relationship 
between the two) of business failure can make important contributions to 
our understanding of the consequences of such failure.
A multi-disciplinary and multi-level approach to understanding 
the implications of entrepreneurial failure. Research investigating the 
inter-connections of the different types of business failure costs has sub-
stantial promise, and we believe that such research will likely necessitate 
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multi-disciplinary and/or multi-level theorization and empirical testing. 
Exploring the inter-relationship between financial and social costs, for 
instance, may require researchers to build on (and ultimately contribute 
to) theories of both stigmatization and venture capital markets to provide 
deeper insights into why some entrepreneurs who have experienced busi-
ness failure in certain regions are able to obtain the funds required to start 
a new entrepreneurial venture, whereas other entrepreneurs who have 
experienced business failure in other regions are unable to obtain such 
funds. Similarly, investigating the inter-relationship between financial and 
social costs may require building on (and ultimately making contributions 
to) theories of both management decision making and organizational cul-
ture to gain a deeper understanding of why employees who have experi-
enced project failure in some organizations are celebrated and promoted, 
whereas employees who have experienced project failure in other orga-
nizations are ostracized and demoted. Due to the drastic change in the 
entrepreneur’s social context (for a public failure) and the often extreme 
feelings accompanying loss after failure, research exploring both the social 
and psychological costs of failure is likely to make important extensions to 
current theories of social cognition.
sensemakIng of entrepreneurIal faIlure
Making sense of loss has been found to be critical to recovery efforts 
(Davis, Nolen-Hoeksema, & Larson, 1998; Park, 2010). A sensemaking 
perspective argues that learning from failure requires one to continuously 
develop plausible retrospective accounts that in turn shape current behav-
ior (Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 2005). The changed beliefs that result 
then alter the actions the individual takes, thereby improving the likeli-
hood of future project/business success. If the individual fails to develop 
and use increasingly more plausible accounts for the failure, anxiety may 
paralyze decision making and action (Lüscher & Lewis, 2008; Smircich & 
Morgan, 1982). The resulting lack of action will decrease the experimen-
tation and social interactions required for successful learning (Balogun 
& Johnson, 2004; Maitlis, 2005). A few underlying assumptions of the 
sensemaking perspective are that constraints (e.g., those causing failure) 
are self-imposed and that the environment is not pre-decided nor is it 
beyond one’s control, both of which are notions in line with the idea of an 
enacted environment (Daft & Weick, 1984; Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991; 
Weick et al., 2005). Future research can add to this body of knowledge by 
exploring entrepreneurial failure using a sensemaking perspective.
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Sensemaking of entrepreneurial failure involves action. Because 
plausibility plays an important role in explaining subsequent action (Weick 
et al., 2005), we need to better understand the way entrepreneurs create 
and/or generate plausible accounts of failure. These accounts—namely, 
the stories we tell ourselves and others—are plausible when the individ-
ual thinks they can be true (Epley & Gilovich, 2006), and they become 
increasingly more plausible as the individual’s thoughts and actions to 
substantiate the proposed story provide satisfactory proof to alter beliefs 
about why the event at hand (e.g., failure) happened. It could be that 
entrepreneurs who take more actions are able to create/generate more 
plausible stories. Indeed, action is an important mechanism of sensemak-
ing as the individual uses the feedback of his or her actions to enhance 
the plausibility of the enacted and emerging story. What are the initial 
actions that entrepreneurs take after failure that reflect the initial story of 
failure and also provide the greatest feedback to enhance the plausibility 
of that story (without necessarily exacerbating the problems and issues 
generated by the failure in the first place)? By studying the reciprocal 
relationship between activities and the development of a plausible story, 
we can begin to develop a behavioral micro-foundation of learning from 
failure.
Individual differences in the sensemaking of entrepreneurial 
failure. There are likely to be different individual variables that help 
explain the extent and/or the speed at which a story for failure becomes 
plausible and are used to initiate entrepreneurial action. Individuals 
who have the greatest prior knowledge of a particular domain or of 
the entrepreneurial process are likely to be those who are best able 
to combine an emerging story of failure with a subsequent opportu-
nity belief to guide the next step in the entrepreneurial process. Does 
education or specific experience (e.g., industry-specific experience) 
play a role here? Perhaps those with greater education and/or expe-
rience are better able to think in the abstract to connect the dots of 
the failure to come up with a plausible story and/or are better able to 
communicate that story and interpret feedback to improve its plausibil-
ity. Furthermore, self-compassion (Neff, 2009; Shepherd & Cardon, 
2009) likely helps entrepreneurs disengage ego-protective mecha-
nisms that would otherwise restrict thinking and creativity that could 
obstruct the construction, revision, and further development of a plau-
sible story. Additionally, analogical thinking facilitates creative thinking 
and the development of explanations by individuals in novel domains 
(Dahl & Moreau, 2002; Gick & Holyoak, 1983), including entre-
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preneurs thinking about potential opportunities (Grégoire, Barr, & 
Shepherd, 2010; Grégoire & Shepherd, 2012). Perhaps individu-
als skilled at analogical thinking are better able to connect the dots 
revealed through entrepreneurial failure to create a plausible story 
of the past to inform future actions. Similarly, mindfulness relates to 
a “heightened state of involvement and wakefulness or being in the 
present” that can be useful in “actively drawing novel distinctions” 
(Langer & Moldoveanu, 2000, p. 2; see also Brown & Ryan, 2003; 
Langer, 1989). Mindful individuals have an enhanced quality of atten-
tion, which is likely to facilitate sensemaking efforts (Weick & Sutcliffe, 
2006). This form of mindfulness may be an important skill that some 
individuals have (and others can learn) to facilitate the process of fail-
ure sensemaking. Finally, it could be that individuals with greater meta-
cognitive awareness—those who think about their thinking (Haynie, 
Shepherd, Mosakowski, & Earley, 2010; Haynie, Shepherd, & Patzelt, 
2012)—are most likely to reflect on the current situation in light of 
their recent failure to develop a plausible story that informs and moti-
vates entrepreneurial action. All of the above variables deserve addi-
tional attention, and we believe that taking a sensemaking perspective 
of failure is likely to push the theoretical boundaries of story construc-
tion after a negative event like failure.
Sensemaking of entrepreneurial failure over time. It is important 
to remember that plausible stories of a failure are temporary outcomes 
of the sensemaking process. Throughout this process, one plausible 
story of business failure is exchanged for another “more” plausible story. 
However, what remains uncertain is how this process unfolds and when it 
terminates. It could be that immediately after business failure, the entre-
preneur creates stories rapidly and then quickly updates those stories as 
new information provides feedback to improve their plausibility. On the 
other hand, it could be that the story reaches saturation over time such 
that additional data provide little useful information. It could also be that 
sensemaking transforms from making sense of a failure to making sense of 
one’s present situation, which would mean that making sense of the failure 
becomes less important. Thus, future research is needed to better explain 
the patterns of plausible stories of failure—specifically, researchers should 
elucidate the antecedents to and consequences of differences in entrepre-
neurs’  “plausibility updating.” That is, why are some quick to update the 
plausibility of a failure story and others slow to do so, and why do some 
stop updating when they do?
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Not only is it interesting to think about the possible antecedents to the 
different patterns of failure sensemaking but also to investigate its out-
comes. Obviously, one outcome is plausibility, but are there tradeoffs to 
achieving this plausibility—are financial, emotional, and social costs exac-
erbated by efforts to quickly develop plausibility? Similarly, perhaps some 
failure sensemaking patterns magnify the financial, emotional, and social 
costs of entrepreneurial failure, while other sensemaking patterns dimin-
ish them. Moreover, as we discussed above, what may diminish one cost 
of failure may work in concert with or against other costs of failure. For 
example, some efforts to enhance the plausibility of the entrepreneurial 
failure story may help reduce the mental anguish the entrepreneur has 
over the failure experience but at the same time increase the financial costs 
of the failure (e.g., because the reflection necessary for enhancing plau-
sibility may take time away from new income-generating actions). There 
are many opportunities to explore the different patterns, contingencies, 
and other configurations that involve sensemaking and the implications of 
failure over time.
The role of others in the sensemaking of entrepreneurial failure. 
After crises, collective sensemaking can enable the development and rede-
velopment social structure—namely, the social roles and relationships in 
certain groups of actors (e.g., Weick, 1995). However, what happens 
when the organization (i.e., in the case of business failure) or the team 
(i.e., in the case of project failure) around which that social structure was 
built no longer exists? Do individuals (e.g., entrepreneurs and investors) 
merely undertake their own sensemaking and carry on, or is there another 
basis or forum for the collective sensemaking process? When entrepre-
neurial team members and/or employees take part in collective sensemak-
ing, which aids in learning and recovery, is the likelihood of attribution 
bias (i.e., developing more plausible stories) reduced, or do these kinds 
of biases extend to the team? The answers to these questions likely reflect 
attributes of the team, such as team members’ emotional capabilities (see 
Shepherd, 2009) and/or the cognitive diversity within the group (Kilduff, 
Angelmar, & Mehra, 2000).
Although team members of a project may feel isolated from oth-
ers after project failure, which inhibits the opportunity for collective 
sensemaking, these feelings of isolation and lack of opportunities for 
collective  sensemaking may be particularly pronounced for entrepre-
neurs of failed businesses. To what extent do members of the founding 
team come together after a business has failed to engage in collective 
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sensemaking? What about solo entrepreneurs—with whom do they try 
to engage for the purpose of collective sensemaking? Perhaps these 
entrepreneurs can try to engage with former stakeholders of the failed 
business to facilitate failure sensemaking, but it may be a difficult task 
to engage with previous stakeholders (they have to be found, and the 
entrepreneur may feel guilty that he or she let them down). On the one 
hand, it could be that approaching these former stakeholders, despite 
facilitating sensemaking, may exacerbate the emotional costs of fail-
ure—namely, generate additional negative emotions by making others’ 
painful experiences resulting from the business failure more salient. On 
the other hand, overcoming the anticipation of a negative stakeholder 
response, the entrepreneur might find it therapeutic to talk with the 
stakeholders and perhaps find that their response is not as negative 
as anticipated. Such engagement may also help the stakeholders deal 
with their negative emotional reaction to the failure. Indeed, help-
ing stakeholders deal with the failure may improve the entrepreneur’s 
own emotional state, and the enhanced sensemaking from engaging 
these knowledgeable individuals may enhance the plausibility of the 
failure story, thus helping to break emotional bonds to the lost object 
(Stroebe & Schut, 2001).
In Fig. 3.1, we offer a sketch of a model of the implications of fail-
ure as part of the entrepreneurial process. Entrepreneurial failure (i.e., 
failure of a project or business) has implications financially (personal 
and business), socially (e.g., stigma and relationship ties), emotionally 
(e.g., grief and positive emotions), and psychologically (in terms of the 
needs for competence, relatedness, and autonomy). The impact of entre-
preneurial failure on these implications can be magnified or dampened 
depending on the culture in which the individual is embedded as well 
as the attributes of the individual (e.g., social skills, positive emotions, 
supportive others, and failure role models). The attributes of the indi-
vidual are inter- related, and some are influenced by culture (and vice 
versa). The financial, social, emotional, and psychological implications 
independently and inter- dependently influence entrepreneurs’ learning 
from failure, motivation to try again, and level of resilience resources and 
capabilities, which in turn influence subsequent entrepreneurial action. 
Learning, motivation, and resilience influence the culture and the attri-
butes of the individual, and entrepreneurial action can influence indi-
viduals’ positive emotions.





























































































































































































































































With the recognition that “opportunity” is central to entrepreneurship 
and that opportunities are shrouded in uncertainty, a logical next step is 
to embrace the importance of understanding the implications of entrepre-
neurial failure. Entrepreneurial action and failure go hand in hand (given 
the high uncertainty), and we have only scratched the surface of this rela-
tionship. Whether exploring the actions of independent entrepreneurs in 
their newly founded (or emerging) organizations or those of corporate 
entrepreneurs in their innovative projects within established organizations, 
the nature of failure and its financial, social, emotional, and psychological 
implications likely have a critical impact on subsequent entrepreneurial 
action. However, despite its “criticality,” we are just starting to gain an 
understanding of the complexity of the many interwoven relationships at 
play for these failure events.
Although it is important to continue to explore main-effect uni- 
directional causal relationships, it will also be important to progress to 
multiple contingent/configurational mutually causal relationships of the 
antecedents and consequences of failure as the basis for a more dynamic 
micro-foundation theory of entrepreneurial action. That is, scholars need 
to overcome their anti-failure bias (McGrath, 1999) to better understand 
the decision making, cognitions, emotions, relationships, and behaviors 
of those involved in the entrepreneurial process. We believe that such 
research will help reconcile a number of paradoxes. A paradox involves 
“contradictory yet inter-related elements that exist simultaneously and 
persist over time” (Smith & Lewis, 2011, p. 382). Being able to iden-
tify the underlying tension between two sets of relationships that seem to 
make sense when they are viewed individually but appear to be contradic-
tory when viewed at the same time can lead to theorizing as an approach 
to resolving the paradox (Shepherd & Suddaby, 2017).
Specifically, we can work toward the following:
 1. Reconciling the perspective of “fail often and quickly” (e.g., real 
options reasoning [McGrath, 1999; McGrath & Nerkar, 2004] and 
design thinking [Brown, 2008; Brown & Wyatt, 2015]) with the 
perspective that failure “hurts” for those who directly experience it 
(Byrne & Shepherd, 2015; Shepherd, 2003; Shepherd et al., 2011).
 2. Reconciling the perspective that failure is a badge of honor (e.g., 
Landier, 2004) with the perspective that failure can stigmatize—put 
a denigrating stain or mark on—those involved with the failure 
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(Semadeni et al., 2008; Shepherd & Patzelt, 2015; Sutton & 
Callahan, 1987).
 3. Reconciling strategies that try to avoid failure (e.g., risk-reduction 
strategies [Azadegan, Patel, & Parida, 2013; Shepherd, Douglas, & 
Shanley, 2000]) with strategies that make failure more likely and 
frequent (Brown, 2008; Brown & Wyatt, 2015; McGrath, 1999; 
McGrath & Nerkar, 2004).
 4. Reconciling the financial benefits of terminating a poorly perform-
ing project (Bakker & Shepherd, 2017; McGrath & Keil, 2007) or 
firm (Ansic & Pugh, 1999) early with the prevalence of permanently 
failing projects (Hisrich & Cahill, 1995) and firms (Meyer & Zucker, 
1989; van Witteloostuijn, 1998).
 5. Reconciling the benefits of a strategy based on a big bet for a big win 
(Courtney, Kirkland, & Viguerie, 1997; Ireland & Miller, 2004) 
with the benefits of making numerous small probes and sequential 
investments with many small failures (Adner & Levinthal, 2004; 
Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997).
 6. Reconciling taking emotions out of project and business failures 
(e.g., desensitization and normalization of failure [Ashforth & 
Kreiner, 2002]) with emotional investments that enhance project 
(Akgün, Keskin, Byrne, & Gunsel, 2011; Rank & Frese, 2008) and 
business performance (for a meta-analysis, see Meyer, Stanley, 
Herscovitch, & Topolnytsky, 2002).
 7. Reconciling the negative emotions of failure that obstruct learning 
(Shepherd, 2003; Shepherd et al., 2011) with the negative emotions 
that capture attention and stimulate sensemaking (Nolen- Hoeksema, 
1998; Schwarz, Bless, & Bohner, 1991).
 8. Reconciling the opportunity lost as a result of the decision to termi-
nate (Drummond, 2005; Roberts & Weitzman, 1981) with the 
opportunity cost of missed opportunities caused by delaying termi-
nation (Gimeno et al., 1997; Shepherd et al., 2014).
 9. Reconciling the use of predetermined stage gates to rapidly termi-
nate a potential opportunity that does not show promise (Cooper, 
2008; Cooper & Kleinschmidt, 1993) with the premature termina-
tion of a potential opportunity that could otherwise have been 
changed and refined through learning and adapting the stage-gate 
criteria (McGrath & Keil, 2007; see also Chap. 4).
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